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Introductory  
Political liberalism is a distinctive account of the normative 
foundations of liberal institutions and practices, developed by John 
Rawls and others in the final decades of the 20th century. It remains 
a fairly active but hardly dominant research programme in political 
philosophy at the beginning of the 21st century. Its most complete 
and influential statement is to be found in the second edition of 
Rawls’ second book, Political Liberalism (1994), and in a few 
preceding and subsequent works by Rawls (2001a, 2001b).  
Like Rawls’ enormously influential theory of ‘justice as fairness’ 
(1971), political liberalism was developed during a time many saw as 
the triumph of liberalism, if by liberalism we understand a 
reasonably stable and not too one-sided marriage between 
constitutional parliamentary democracy and capitalism. In 
retrospect, neither the early 1970s nor the early 1990s look that way. 
Triumphalism withered away in the years following the publication 
of both works. The early seventies mark the beginning of the end 
of balance in that metaphorical marriage, with the return of extreme 
inequality and the slow unraveling of mass involvement in 
representative politics at the end of the trente glorieuses (1945-75), to 
use the phrase popularised by Thomas Piketty’s (2013) famous 
study of inequality in capitalist liberal democracies. Rawls had been 
working on A Theory of Justice since the early fifties though, so his 
view can retrospectively be seen as a eulogy for an age of significant 
state-led attempts to mitigate the adverse effects of capitalism on at 
least some of society’s most vulnerable segments. More importantly 
for our present purposes, the late eighties and early nineties—when 
Political Liberalism was completed and published—were widely seen 
as a victory march for liberalism, despite the changed economic 
circumstances. This was due to the collapse of liberalism’s main 
rival, the Soviet Union’s “actually existing socialism”. That triumph 
quickly turned into a crisis even faster than was the case for social 
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democracy. New, serious challenges for Western liberal 
democracies emerged, and started dominating academic and public 
discourse by the turn of the century: increasing cultural diversity, 
sovereignty erosion through globalisation, new nationalisms, 
international terrorism, the rise of China, illiberal populism. Rawls 
formulated political liberalism ostensibly to address what he 
perceived as theoretical weaknesses of his earlier work; one may also 
see it as a timely, even prescient response to actual political 
problems of liberal societies, especially as concerns the 
accommodation of diversity, the role of religion in public life 
(especially in the United States), and the place of non-liberals within 
those societies.  
So, just as A Theory of Justice appeared soon before many started 
to question the social justice of the increasingly marketised Western 
polities, Political Liberalism—a theory of (liberal) legitimacy—
appeared at a time of intense scrutiny of the ability of liberal 
democracies to offer satisfactory grounds for their authority. Both 
books revived liberal social contract theory, albeit in different ways, 
as well shall see below.  The next section of this chapter provides a 
philosophical rather than philological reconstruction of the latter 
effort, political liberalism. The subsequent sections provide a 
conceptual framework to make sense of its reception. I characterise 
two main families of responses to political liberalism, and devote a 
section to each. Focusing on political liberalism’s critical reception 
illuminates an overarching philosophical question: was Rawls’ 
revival of a contractualist approach to liberal legitimacy a fruitful 
move for either liberalism and/or the social contract tradition? The 
last section contains a largely negative answer to that question. 
Nonetheless I conclude that the research programme of political 
liberalism provided and continues to provide illuminating insights 
into the limitations of liberal contractualism, especially under 
conditions of persistent and radical diversity. The programme is, 
however, less receptive to challenges to do with the relative decline 
of the power of modern states. 
 
Political Liberalism  
John Rawls is widely credited with reviving Western political 
philosophy in the 20th century. This may be true, if by ‘political 
philosophy’ we mean the sort of normative theory practiced within 
the vast majority of Anglophone philosophy departments, as 
opposed to the more social theory-inflected, less ‘normativistic’ 
(Jaeggi 2009) strands of political thought commonly associated with 
the European continent. At any rate the aspect of Rawls’s work that 
concerns us here is, perhaps primarily, a contribution to a tradition 
that pre-dates that schism, namely the social contract tradition—a 
tradition intimately though not exclusively linked with what would 
later be recognised as the liberal canon.  
Reference to the social contract may perplex some in a chapter 
devoted to political liberalism, as Rawls’s revival of contractualism 
is usually associated with A Theory of Justice (discussed elsewhere in 
this volume). Famously, in that work the “original position” updated 
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the state of nature of early modern political philosophers, whereas 
there is no such thought experiment in Political Liberalism. But there 
is another important sense in which the later work is contractualist, 
and in some ways closer to the project of the early modern social 
contract theorists. For one thing, the original position aims at 
developing a theory of justice rather than legitimacy; whereas 
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau were primarily concerned with 
showing why we should have a coercive order at all. But there is a 
theory of political obligation within justice as fairness—just not a 
contractualist one, even though it provides the link to the 
contractualist theory of legitimacy found in Political Liberalism.  
Indeed, Rawls's theory of political obligation remains roughly 
unchanged between the two books. This theory says that we have a 
“duty of justice”: a natural duty to obey just institutions (1971: 114ff, 
334-5; 1994: 142ff). Crucially, this duty arises just in case citizens 
recognise the relevant just institutions as just: “Citizens would not 
be bound to even a just constitution unless they have accepted and 
intend to continue to accept its benefits. Moreover this acceptance 
must be in some appropriate sense voluntary.” (1971: 336; also see 
1994: xviii-ff). In the earlier work Rawls maintained that, with just 
institutions in place, citizens would develop an appropriate sense of 
justice and so recognise them as just (1971, chapter VIII). Later he 
came to see this view as mistaken, for under the freedom afforded 
by just institutions citizens would develop a variety of conceptions 
of the good, which in turn would support a variety of conceptions 
of justice for institutions. This pluralism is not to be stamped out; it 
is to be respected as the product of just institutions. Rawls calls this 
“the problem of stability”, and makes it the main motivating 
question of Political Liberalism: “How is it possible that there may 
exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens 
profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines?” (1994: xx). Explaining what 
sort of consensus could sustain such a society is the project of 
political liberalism. It is a contractualist project because it is about 
individuating what (hypothetical) features of the citizens’ 
motivational and volitional sets make it the case that a state may 
legitimately coerce them.   
Before discussing Rawls’s solution, let us bring the problem of 
stability into sharper focus.  Somewhat misleadingly, Rawls uses the 
term ‘stability’ in a technical sense, to cover two distinct yet 
connected issues: the need for peaceful coexistence (as the term 
would suggest), and the need for a morally acceptable consensus 
(hence the occasional phrase “stability for the right reasons”). 
Importantly, we can see each of the two aspects of the problem of 
stability as embodying a key desideratum of political liberalism: a 
realistic desideratum, directed at including genuine diversity, and an 
idealistic desideratum, directed at establishing the sort of consensus of 
free and equal citizens that would satisfy broadly liberal moral 
commitments. The desiderata are in tension.1 Throughout this 
chapter I will present the reception of political liberalism as 
                                                           
1 For a detailed discussion of this tension see D’Agostino (1996). 
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revolving around the assessment of Rawls’s way of dealing with that 
tension.   
So what is Rawls’s solution to the problem of stability? Given 
that few would argue that a coercive institution can be compatible 
with any and all conceptions of the good, Rawls needs a criterion 
for individuating the conceptions of the good worthy of inclusion. 
To this end he introduces the idea of reasonable pluralism. The set of 
reasonable citizens is the widest possible set of citizens that may 
form a consensus around a broadly liberal political conception of 
justice, such as (but not limited to) justice as fairness: reasonable 
persons see the inevitability of serious and persistent disagreement 
and, further, that it would be wrong to try to stamp it out. They “see 
that the burdens of judgment set limits on what can be reasonably 
justified to others, and so they endorse some form of liberty of 
conscience and freedom of thought” (1994: 61). One may question 
the inference from reasonable disagreement to liberal freedoms, but 
Rawls does not, so his reasonable citizens “desire for its own sake a 
social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with 
others on terms all can accept” (1994: 52). Again, notice the two 
desiderata play out in the notion of reasonable pluralism: crudely, 
Rawls wants diversity, provided it is compatible with consensus on 
liberal values. How can this be achieved? How much diversity is 
compatible with reasonableness? 
The answer is in the idea of reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
forming an overlapping consensus on a political—i.e. not 
comprehensive—conception of justice for the basic structure of 
society. Let us parse that jargon-ridden formulation. A 
comprehensive doctrine, whether religious or philosophical, is a 
conception of the good covering most aspects of what is valuable 
in human life. A political conception of justice is the set of norms 
regulating the basic structure of society, that is «society’s main 
political, constitutional, and economic institutions and how they fit 
together to form a unified scheme of social cooperation from one 
generation to the next» (1994: 11). Note how a political conception 
is smaller in scope than a comprehensive conception: the former 
only applies to the domain of the political, the latter regulates all that 
is valuable in human life, including the political. So the political 
conception of justice cannot be added to the comprehensive 
doctrine, which, as such, admits of no other moral authorities. It 
follows that if many comprehensive doctrines are to converge on a 
single political conception of justice they must be able to overlap on 
some key political commitments. One must be able to support a 
single (liberal) political conception starting from a plurality of 
comprehensive doctrines:2 
While we want a political conception to have a justification by reference 
to one or more comprehensive doctrines, it is neither presented as, nor 
                                                           
2 Rawls was heavily influenced by Judith Shklar here: “Liberalism does not in 
principle have to depend on specific religious or philosophical systems of 
thought. It does not have to choose among them as long as they do not reject 
toleration” (1989: 24). However, as Bernard Yack (2017) observes, while Shklar 
was guided by a properly political concern with limiting state power, Rawls 
reinterprets this idea as being about the moral justification of liberal authority. 
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as derived from, such a doctrine applied to the basic structure of society, 
as if this structure were simply another subject to which that doctrine 
applied. [...] We must distinguish between how a political conception is 
presented and its being part of, or as derivable within, a comprehensive 
doctrine. I assume all citizens to affirm a comprehensive doctrine to 
which the political conception they accept is somehow related. But a 
distinguishing feature of a political conception is that it is presented as 
freestanding and expounded apart from, or without reference to, any 
such wider background. (1994: 12, emphasis added). 
To fix ideas, here is a simple schematic representation of how 
comprehensive doctrines (just two, in this case) can provide the 
justificatory support for an overlapping consensus: 
 
 
 
[Fig. 1 - From comprehensive doctrines to an overlapping consensus on a 
political conception of justice] 
 
Note the role of justification. In a legitimate liberal state a 
political conception of justice must be presented in compliance with 
what Rawls calls public reason, i.e. publicly justified in terms of values 
and ideas others may reasonably accept, since they are implicit in the 
public culture of society. Now, insofar as they are implicit in the 
public culture, are these sources of justification available to citizens 
as they actually are, or as they should be?  
One overly simplified way to answer that question is to say that 
they are available to reasonable citizens as they are. What exactly 
‘available’ means, and what percentage of citizens are actually 
reasonable, are much debated questions we will touch upon below. 
For now, simply note how different ways of answering those 
questions will place different amounts of emphasis on the realistic 
or the idealistic desideratum of political liberalism. The realistic 
desideratum posits that the overlapping consensus should be 
formed by reasons citizens actually have. The idealistic desideratum 
says that those reasons are reasons citizens should have. So, for 
instance, is there a sense in which liberal rule ought to be justified 
to the many residents of liberal states who do not share the 
commitment—required by reasonableness—to seeking fair terms of 
cooperations among free and equal citizens? How, exactly, is public 
justification supposed to make a difference to the justificatory status 
of a (liberal) regime? As anticipated, different strands in the 
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reception of political liberalism can be individuated on the basis of 
their answers to those and other, related questions. This diagram 
shows the reasons that may contribute to an overlapping consensus. 
As we will see in the next two sections, it also provides a synoptic 
representation of the main cleavages among interpreters and critics 
of Rawlsian political liberalism:  
 
 
 
[Fig. 2 - Citizens’ reasons in an overlapping consensus]  
 
Schematically: Rawls thought that the overlap of the two sets is 
large enough or, to put it differently, he took actual liberal-
democratic citizenries to be sufficiently close to reasonableness. As 
Thomas Nagel put it, what is distinctive about this approach is that 
it tries to retain an element of voluntarism, and as such stands in 
opposition to broadly consequentialist views of legitimacy that 
focus exclusively on the values and virtues embodied, protected or 
expressed by political institutions: 
The task of discovering the conditions of legitimacy is traditionally 
conceived as that of finding a way to justify a political system to 
everyone who is required to live under it [...] the search for legitimacy 
can be thought of as an attempt to realise some of the values of voluntary 
participation in a system of institutions that is unavoidably compulsory 
(1991: 33–36, emphasis added). 
Not many scholars carry on that exact project, partly because it 
has come under severe criticism, partly, perhaps, because 
philosophers are often disinclined to stake their normative positions 
on the delicate balance of attitudes in existing citizenries.3 Most 
responses to Rawls’s project are either more idealistic or more 
realistic—they place more weight on the reasons citizens should 
have and do have, respectively, and less weight on the intersection. 
To be sure, that cannot do justice to the nuance of the many views 
put forward in each of the families of responses I identify, but it 
                                                           
3 An important exception is George Klosko (2000), who tackles the problem of 
stability through an empirical investigation of the possibility of the overlapping 
consensus Rawls had only discussed speculatively. Other noteworthy 
contributions to the project of political liberalism as understood by Rawls are 
Quong (2011) and Weithman (2011), who introduce many important 
clarifications and addenda. I shall not discuss their views here, however, since the 
overall position they defend remains very close to Rawls’s. 
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should give a sense of the various directions of enquiry sparked by 
Rawls’ contribution. 
So our discussion, if only for reasons of space, is limited to 
relatively constructive engagements with political liberalism, 
however critical. In fact figure 2 cannot capture the views—
however compelling—of those critics of political liberalism who 
deem the entire project incoherent or unstable (e.g. Bohman & 
Richardson 2009; Enoch 2015, Wall 2002, Raz 1990):4 on those 
views there is either not enough or no overlap between the two sets 
of reasons, and/or neither set can legitimise liberalism on its own. 
More generally, as in previous iterations of debates on the social 
contract, those drawn to a substantive welfarist, perfectionist, or 
more generally consequentialist approach to normative political 
theory will have little time for what remains a broadly deontological-
procedural approach (Arneson 2000). Neither can the figure capture 
critiques that reject broad commitments to forms of liberal 
democracy, if anything because political liberalism itself is not 
addressed to that audience: for better or worse, political liberalism 
is an internal articulation rather than an external defence of liberal-
democratic commitments.  
 
Idealist Reactions 
There are a number of pro tanto reasons why a philosopher may 
wish to lean towards the idealistic side when formulating a theory 
of liberal legitimacy through public reason. The question, however, 
is whether one can focus primarily on the idealistic desideratum 
while still satisfying the realistic one, or, alternatively, manage to 
explain why the realistic desideratum is not worthy of much 
consideration. In this section we will consider a few such attempts, 
arranged in a crescendo of idealisation. 
Before discussing those explicit attempts to formulate 
alternative theories of public reason, however, I should at least 
mention the important theoretical strand sparked by the well-known 
debate between Rawls (1995) and his major German contemporary, 
Jürgen Habermas (1995). Initially many commentators judged the 
terms of the debate to be unclear. Over time, however, the issues at 
stake have been made clearer.5 Habermas himself distilled the kernel 
of their disagreement in a recent precis:  
a problem […], in my view, besets the construction of the "overlapping 
consensus". The correctness of the political conception of justice is 
supposed, on the one hand, to be measured by whether it can be 
integrated into the different comprehensive doctrines as a module; on 
the other hand, only the "reasonable" doctrines that recognize the 
primacy of political values are supposed to be admitted to this test. It 
remains unclear which side trumps the other, the competing groups with 
a shared worldview who can say "no", or practical reason that prescribes 
in advance which voices count. In my opinion, the practical reason 
expressed in the citizens' public use of their reason should have the final 
word here, too. This admittedly calls for a philosophical justification of 
the universal validity of a morality of equal respect for everyone. Rawls 
                                                           
4 For an overview of the most important objections of this sort see Quong (2013), 
Section 7. 
5 See, e.g., Finlayson and Freyenhagen (2011). 
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want to sidestep this task by confining himself to a "freestanding" theory 
of political justice. (2011: 285) 
Here we being to see the contours of the idealistic responses  to 
political liberalism: what matters is not so much picking out the 
intersection of actual and ideal reasons, but identifying the correct 
ideal reasons that are to inform a hypothetical agreement. Following 
broadly from that approach, Rainer Forst has developed a 
conception of liberalism whereby Habermas’s universal morality of 
equal respect is instantiated in the more explicitly Rawlsian idea of 
a “right to justification”, or Recht zu Rechtfertigung, in the more vivid 
German phrase (2011). Habermas and, to a lesser extent, Forst, may 
be seen as hopeful that their preferred ideal reasons could in some 
sense be read into any or most actual claims for political 
participation in liberal democracies.6 That weakens but retains 
Rawls’s aspiration for some overlap between public justification and 
citizens’ actual reasons.  
Other theorists take on board the Rawlsian project of public 
justification while explicitly rejecting the effort to find a suitable 
intersection between the actually-held and ideally-held reasons that 
may be used in the political sphere of liberal democracies. They 
insist that, crudely, what is important about public justification is 
that it picks out a relevant class of justificatory considerations that 
have the ability to ground liberal political authority sub specie 
aeternitatis, as it were. The most prominent exponent of this sort of 
view is Gerald Gaus. Gaus’s position has changed considerably over 
time, culminating in a project to extend his take on the idea of public 
reason well beyond the realm of liberal political philosophy, to the 
wider sphere of ‘social morality’ (2010). For our purposes here, 
however, we should focus on his earlier, closer engagement with 
political liberalism. Coarsely put, Gaus argues that public 
justification’s legitimising force is found entirely in the epistemic 
qualities of an appropriately specified, public account of normative 
justifiability, and so not at all in citizens’ actual dispositions towards 
the publicly justified institutions. For Gaus, Rawls is guilty of 
‘justificatory populism’ (1996: 130-134): public justification that 
employs reasons available to actual (albeit reasonable) citizens 
sanctions normative principles that do not satisfy even rather 
modest standards of rational justification. We should rather use 
reasons that are merely accessible to citizens (i.e. public), even though 
they may not be acceptable to them. As Steven Wall noted, Rawls’s 
idea of public justification can be read as containing two necessary 
and jointly sufficient conditions: 
proponents of the public justification principle rightly insist on the 
publicity and acceptability requirements. Violation of the publicity 
requirement makes it difficult, if not impossible, for people to understand 
the reasons which explain why they should accept the authority that 
constrains them. Violation of the acceptability requirement makes it 
impossible for them reasonably to accept these reasons (Wall 2002: 388, 
emphasis added). 
Gaus’s account of public justification, then, seeks to combine 
both requirement into a notion of accessibility. It is not possible to 
                                                           
6 I criticise similar views in Rossi (2013a). 
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discuss this move satisfactorily here.7 Suffice it to note how one may 
question whether mere accessibility could embody the 
voluntarism—however faint and hypothetical—that distinguishes 
public justification views from broadly consequentialist approaches 
to (liberal) legitimacy.8 
 
Realist Reactions 
On the other side of the spectrum of reactions to Rawls’s 
project we find theorists who, to put it roughly, think that anything 
resembling a social contract for a liberal-democratic society should 
be based on reasons actually shared by the citizenry, and that 
Rawlsian reasonableness constraints on public justification are too 
stringent. The rough idea here is that one may consistently uphold 
liberal-democratic institutions even while violating Rawls’s “duty of 
civility” to couch one’s arguments in terms that others may 
reasonably accept. Politics is, these theorists argue, more akin to a 
domain of conflict with winners and losers than to an enterprise of 
joint construction of common ground. Consensus of the sort 
envisaged by Rawls is chimeric, and trying to achieve it can be 
stifling if not downright oppressive. Defences of that general 
position take various forms, which we may divide into three groups, 
with some overlap at the margins: (i) proponents of modus vivendi, 
(ii) agonistic democrats, and (iii) realist liberals. 
In Political Liberalism Rawls contrasts the idea of an overlapping 
consensus with that of a ‘mere’ modus vivendi (1994: 126), which is 
‘political in the wrong’ way, as it may sanction power equilibria in 
reached in ways that do not respect the equal standing of those 
involved. A number of theorists, however, resist Rawls’s negative 
characterisation of modus vivendi (e.g. Gray 2000, Hershovitz, 
Horton 2003, Mills 2000; Arnsperger & Picavet 2004 and Wendt 
2016 offer intermediate positions). If there is a common 
denominator to those views, it is that under conditions of pluralism 
often a modus vivendi agreement is as much of an agreement as one 
can, or perhaps even should hope for. A worrying question remains, 
however, as to whether it is worth retaining the voluntaristic 
aspirations of the idea of an agreement or compromise, while not 
being prepared to ensure that the agreement is indeed voluntary in 
a robust sense (Rossi 2010). 
Agonistic democrats take some of the concerns of modus 
vivendi theorists in a more radical direction. Chantal Mouffe is 
perhaps the most prominent exponent of this approach,9 which she 
anchors in a critique of Rawls’s project. Her main contention is that 
the project of making society’s fundamental norms of justice float 
free from the controversial comprehensive doctrines held by the 
citizenry amounts to “the elimination of the very idea of the 
                                                           
7 For such a discussion see Rossi (2014). 
8 A worry made more salient when one considers how Gaus’s approach may be 
extended: Kevin Vallier (2011), for instance, has taken the focus on justification’s 
epistemic qualities to an extreme where even mere accessibility becomes surplus 
to requirement for liberal legitimacy. 
9 But also see Connolly (1991), Honig (1993). 
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political” (1993: 51), for the political properly understood does not 
admit of neat partitions between questions of basic rights and justice 
and other questions of values and interests, or between public and 
private. Among genuine political adversaries there can be no 
consensus of the sort envisaged by Rawls nor, relatedly, can there 
be neat lines between liberal rights and the democratic reach of a 
sovereign people (Mouffe 2000). It is not entirely clear, however, 
whether this more confrontational and fluid model of democracy 
will satisfy the moral commitments of many liberals (Fossen 2008).  
More recently, realist political philosophers have been 
defending positions in some respects comparable to Mouffe’s. The 
starting point here is Bernard Williams’s posthumous work on 
liberalism and the methodology of political philosophy. Williams 
proposes an account of liberal legitimacy that eschews the heavy 
moral commitments found in political liberalism; nonetheless he 
retains the idea that a legitimate political order must, inter alia, have 
“something to say” to those it coerces. It must “make sense” (2005: 
4-6) to them. And, as it turns out, under modern conditions only a 
liberal order can satisfy those requirements, Williams argues. One 
can see how this could be interpreted as yet another attempt to 
weaken the demands of the overlapping consensus while preserving 
some of the voluntaristic appeal of public justification (Sleat 2010), 
in which case one may wonder whether this is not just an iteration 
of the modus vivendi strategy (Horton 2010), with the 
accompanying problems (Rossi 2013b). However on closer 
inspection one can come to understand Williams’s quasi-
contractualist talk of acceptability and justification as simply a 
heuristic to distinguish between raw domination and political 
coercion (Hall 2015)—more of a recognition of the limits of liberal 
contractualism than a new lease of life for it.  
 
Prospects 
The preceding discussion shows how the most prominent 
research programmes sparked by or at any rate developed in 
reaction to political liberalism have travelled rather far from Rawls’s 
project. We should be wary of doing philosophy by opinion poll. 
Nonetheless taking stock of the prevalence of academic scepticism 
regarding Rawls’s project may tell us something salient in the 
political climate of the early 21st century, which is characterised by 
increasing diversity as well as by a decline of state power. The 
relatively recent rise (or return) of populism in many Western liberal 
democracies has been accompanied by the development of 
increasingly insular and polarised media discourses, by a decline of 
trust in scientific expertise, and, especially in the United States, by 
the return of religion in politics—so, in general, public political 
discourse in liberal democracies is increasingly unhinged from the 
epistemic and moral parameters set out by political liberalism. This 
is perhaps tragically ironic given that Rawls’s efforts were aimed 
precisely at accommodating pluralism and at finding a way to make 
sincerely held religious belief compatible with liberal commitments. 
It looks as though Rawls was prescient but ineffective: he had the 
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right diagnosis in terms of what was going to be the next big 
challenge for liberalism, but also an ineffective cure. Some may even 
speculate that, to the extent that the cure was applied at all, it was 
counterproductive: consider the frequent invocation of a backlash 
against norms of civility for public political discourse.  
That loose narrative yields a moral with regard to the two 
strands of reactions to political liberalism we have been considering, 
namely that the idealistic reactions are bound to fare worse than the 
realistic ones. But in what sense can political circumstances play a 
role in determining whether a normative political theory fares worse 
than another? One may simply insist that Rawls or even the 
philosophers who carry political liberalism further in an idealist 
direction are correct in their interpretation of what liberal legitimacy 
requires, and so that, from a liberal point of view, we live in dark 
times indeed. That is a consistent position. On the other hand, one 
may question the wisdom of using high abstraction and moral 
condemnation to avoid having to come to terms with some of the 
most pressing political problems we face.10  
At any rate, as we have seen, it is not as if the realistic correctives 
to political liberalism are devoid of serious problems. It might just 
be the case, then, that at least in this form contractualist liberalism 
has run its course, given the levels of diversity in contemporary 
liberal societies, as opposed to the early modern European societies 
where the approach originated. Political liberalism and its 
constructive reception are worthwhile efforts to save that approach, 
and the debates we surveyed here are an instructive way to 
understand its limitations as we continue to look for alternative 
solutions, be they unabashedly teleological liberalism, realist 
liberalism, or departures from liberalism in the direction of radical 
democracy and other, less travelled roads. The difficulties with 
political liberalism discussed here certainly show how this research 
programme has the merit of having brought issues of cultural and 
moral diversity to the forefront of political theorising. However, 
since the tradition of liberal contractualism is closely bound to the 
rise of modern states, it casts far less light on those aspects of the 
crisis of contemporary liberal-democratic regimes that can be 
ascribed to globalisation and the decline of state power.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
10 A point eloquently made by Charles Mills (2005), and also found, mutatis 
mutandis, in much contemporary realist political thought (Rossi and Sleat 2014). 
11 Research for this essay was supported by the Dutch National Science 
Organisation’s Vidi project ‘Legitimacy Beyond Consent’ (grant n. 016.164.351). 
The work was presented at the University of Milan. I’m grateful to the audience 
for their feedback, and to Giulia Bistagnino for her thoughtful commentary. I also 
thank Blain Neufeld for his comments. 
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